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Statutory Rules of Evidence for
Eminent Domain
Proceedings*
By ROBERT F. CARLSON*
History of the Statute
CALIFORNIA'S bustling economy and surging population has
brought about a need for land to accommodate new public structures
of every kind, from freeways and schools to dams and aqueducts. The
acquisition of property for the construction of public improvements by
federal agencies, the State of California, and local entities has in recent
years become a more frequent occurrence. General practitioners have
thus become more involved in representing clients in condemnation
matters. One area of specific concern has been the difficulty in deter-
mining the case law rules of evidence that are applicable to eminent
domain proceedings.
Last year the California legislature partially codified and changed
these case law rules by the enactment of sections 810-22 of the new
California Evidence Code. At the same time, virtually the same pro-
visions were added to the Code of Civil Procedure' as an interim mea-
sure until the Evidence Code becomes operative.
The legislative history of the eminent domain evidence statute had
its genesis at the 1961 legislative session when State Senator James A.
Cobey introduced Senate bill 205, which was the product of the
California Law Revision Commission.' Although Senate bill 205 was
* This article is an adaptation of a paper entitled "Valuation Testimony in Con-
demnation Cases," presented by the author to the Conference of California Judges at
their Annual Workshop on May 14, 1966, in San Francisco, California, and is based in
part upon a pamphlet co-written by the author, entitled "An Analysis of the California
Evidence Code Provisions Relating to Evidence in Eminent Domain and Inverse Con-
demnation Proceedings," published and distributed by the Continuing Education of the
Bar for the fall 1966 program on the new Evidence Code.
** A.B., 1949, St. Mary's College; LL.B., 1952, Hastings College of the Law. Mem-
ber, Sacramento Bar. Assistant Chief Counsel, Department of Public Works of the State
of California.
1 CAL. CODE Civ. Pnoc. §§ 1268-72.4.
2 The California Law Revision Commission was authorized by Assembly Concurrent
Resolution No. 10, Cal. Stat. 1957, ch. 42, at 265, to make a study to determine whether
the law and procedure relating to condemnation should be revised in order to safeguard
the property rights of private citizens. The recommendation of the Law Revision Com-
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vetoed by the Governor,3 the Commission provided comments to the
sections of this bill, which contained many of the provisions currently
enacted in the Evidence Code. As there are no official Law Revision
Commission comments or legislative committee comments attached to
either the interim Code of Civil Procedure sections or the Evidence
Code sections, the comments to Senate bill 205 may be helpful in
determining legislative intent. On the other hand, the fact that some
sections were either amended or omitted by the legislature indicates
legislative intent to reject the Commission's recommendation. 4
Application of the Statute
Evidence Code section 810 provides that Article 2, "Value, Dam-
ages, and Benefits in Eminent Domain and Inverse Condemnation
Cases," is intended to provide special rules of evidence that are appli-
cable only to eminent domain proceedings and inverse condemnation
actions. Thus, other actions and proceedings involving the valuation
of real property are still governed by case law.5 Appraisers and attor-
neys have two sets of rules for valuation of real property, depending
upon the type of case involved. Confusion would seem to be the net
result. It may be that the trial and appellate courts will want uniform-
ity and may well follow the new evidence rules for all cases involving
the valuation of real property. In any event, the Law Revision Com-
mission and the legislature should consider legislation making the
Evidence Code provisions applicable to all actions and special pro-
ceedings involving the valuation of real property.
Section 6, chapter 1151, statutes of 1965, provides that the new
mission and the study by its consultant, the Los Angeles law firm of Hill, Farter, and
Burrill, is contained in 3 CAL. LAw RE ON CowN, REPoTs, EcomuNDA-n Ns &
Svumas A5-A65.
8 FJNAL CAmNAR oF LEGIsLATIv. Bus NEss-1961 REGULAR SnssxoN 197. The
primary reason for the Governor's veto of the 1961 bill was the numerous amendments
to the bill in its passage through the legislature.
The same bill was introduced at the 1963 session of the legislature as S.B. 129, but
not sponsored by the Law Revision Commission. Again, it was vetoed by the Governor.
FniAL CALENDAR OF LEGI.sLATivE BusnmEss-1963 BREGULA SEssioN 51.
4 In June of 1964, Pennsylvania enacted a comprehensive Eminent Domain Code.
Sections 701 through 706 relating to evidence are in part patterned after the legislation
originally proposed by the California Law Revision Commission. Pennsylvania decisions
construing sections comparable to those in California should be helpful to the legal
researcher.
5E.g., actions or proceedings involving fraud, partition, probate, tax, depreciation
allowances, sale of real property, damage to real property, insurance coverage of in-
sured, real property conversion, trespass, property agreements in divorce actions, trusts,
and breach of contracts dealing with real property.
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rules of evidence in eminent domain proceedings do not apply to any
action or proceeding that has been "brought to trial" prior to Septem-
ber 17, 1965.
The phrase "brought to trial" does have a somewhat fixed meaning
by drawing on cases that have analyzed other statutes using the same
phrase.6 Retrials and new trials are governed by the evidence rules
applicable to the original trial.7
Like all new enactments of the legislature, there will be instances
where appraisers and attorneys who are not acquainted with the new
legislation will be using appraisal reports prepared and completed be-
fore September 17, 1965. Where these appraisal reports contain data
which is inadmissible under the new statute, e.g., the price paid by a
condemnor in other eminent domain acquisitions,8 and the attorney
uses such information on direct or cross-examination, there will be
not only an objection to the question or a motion to strike the answer,
but possibly a mistrial declared by the court.
There appears to be a conflict between section 6 of chapter 1151
and section 12 of the Evidence Code.9 Section 12 defines when a "trial
is commenced," whereas section 6 did not. Also, section 12 provides
that a new trial or separate trial of a different issue commenced on or
after January 1, 1967, is governed by the Evidence Code. In construing
section 6 of chapter 1151, together with section 12 of the Evidence
Code, it would appear that: (1) Case law will govern condemnation
cases brought to trial before September 17, 1965. (2) Section 6 will
6 An action is usually "brought to trial" when the first witness is sworn or the
first exhibit is introduced into evidence on any issue in the case, or, in a jury trial, when
the jury is impaneled. Adams v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 867, 345 P.2d 466 (1959);
Bella Vista Dev. Co. v. Superior Court, 223 Cal. App. 2d 603, 36 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1963).
7 People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Murata, 55 Cal. 2d 1, 9 Cal. Rptr.
601, 357 P.2d 833 (1960).
8 CAL. EVmENCE CODE § 822(a).
9 CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 12 provides: "(a) This code shall become operative on
January 1, 1967, and shall govern proceedings in actions brought on or after that date
and, except as provided in subdivision (b), further proceedings in actions pending on
that date.
"(b) Subject to subdivision (c), a trial commenced before January 1, 1967, shall
not be governed by this code. For the purpose of this subdivision: (1) A trial is com-
menced when the first witness is sworn or the first exhibit is admitted into evidence
and is terminated when the issue upon which such evidence is received is submitted
to the trier of fact. A new trial, or a separate trial of a different issue, commenced on
or after January 1, 1967, shall be governed by this code. (2) If an appeal is taken
from a ruling made at a trial commenced before January 1, 1967, the appellate court
shall apply the law applicable at the time of the commencement of the trial.
"(c) The provisions of Division 8 (commencing with Section 900) relating to
privileges shall govern any claim of privilege made after December 31, 1966."
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govern condemnation cases brought to trial on or after September 17,
1965. (3) Retrials or new trials of condemnation cases brought to trial
before January 1, 1967, will be governed by the evidence rules appli-
cable to the original trial. (4) The Evidence Code will govern condem-
nation cases brought to trial on or after January 1, 1967. (5) Although
not free from doubt, it appears that retrials and new trials of condem-
nation cases on or after January 1, 1967, will be governed by the new
Evidence Code.10
Appraisal Approaches to Valuation
The Evidence Code has given statutory recognition to the three
generally accepted approaches or methods to arrive at an opinion of
market value: (1) the sales approach; (2) the income approach; and
(3) the cost or summation approach. All three approaches can now
be the subject of testimony by a qualified witness on direct examina-
tion. Previously, the California courts did not permit an expert witness
in an eminent domain proceeding to testify on direct examination
about the capitalized value of the income from the property being
condemned-1 or about the cost less depreciation of replacing the im-
provements on the property being condemned.12 Until the decision of
the California Supreme Court in County of Los Angeles v. Faus,13 in
1957, an expert was not permitted to testify on direct examination
about the sales prices of comparable property that he considered in
reaching his opinion of value.
The Comparable Sales Approach
Two sections of the Evidence Code-section 815,14 Sales of Subject
10 Since the new rules of evidence in eminent domain proceedings are incorporated
into the new Evidence Code, a court could well decide, for the sake of uniformity, that
§ 12 of the Evidence Code is controlling over Cal. Stat. 1965, c. 1151, § 6, at 2907.
The only serious type of case would involve the retrial or new trial on or after January 1,
1967, of a case originally brought to trial before September 17, 1965, because chapter
1151 provides that the case law rules are applicable, whereas CAr. EVDmENcE CoDE § 12
provides that the Evidence Code applies.
11 Stockton & C.R.R. v. Galgiani, 49 Cal. 139, 140 (1874).
12 City of Oakland v. Partridge, 214 Cal. App. 2d 196, 200-01, 29 Cal. Rptr. 388,
390-91 (1963).
I '48 Cal. 2d 672, 312 P.2d 680 (1957).
14 CAL. EvmENcE CoDE § 815 provides: "When relevant to the determination of the
value of property, a witness may take into account as a basis for his opinion the price
and other terms and circumstances of any sale or contract to sell and purchase which
included the property or property interest being valued or any part thereof if the sale
or contract was freely made in good faith within a reasonable time before or after the
date of valuation, except that where the sale or contract to sell and purchase includes
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Property, and section 816,15 Comparable Sales-codify the sales ap-
proach to market value.
There are several noteworthy similarities, as well as differences, be-
tween the two code sections. Both sections, in addition to applying to
a completed sale, are also applicable to a "contract to sell and pur-
chase" the subject property or comparable property. Case law prior to
the code followed this view.16 It should be noted that options to pur-
chase the subject property or comparable property are inadmissible."
The second similarity is that the appraiser is allowed to take into ac-
count as a basis for his opinion not only "the price" but "other terms
and circumstances" with respect to sales involving the subject property
and sales of comparable property.
The differences between section 815 and section 816 are threefold.
First, section 816 specifically states the elements or factors of compara-
bility, whereas in section 815, Sales of Subject Property, there are no
elements or factors of comparability, since the sale is a sale of all or
part of the same property being valued. Secondly, section 816 codifies
the rule stated in the case of County of Los Angeles v. Faus,5 insofar
as it sets out nearness in location and similarity in character, situation,
usability, and improvements as the elements of comparability. How-
ever, the Faus case did not specifically mention size as a factor in de-
termining comparability. Size will now be a factor by the specific
reference to it in section 816.19 The addition of this factor of compara-
bility will prevent an appraiser from considering lot sales as compara-
ble sales in his valuation of large acreages.
The third difference concerns sales made after the date of valua-
only the property or property interest being taken or a part thereof such sale or contract
to sell and purchase may not be taken into account if it occurs after the Sling of the
lis pendens."
15 CAL. EvmmCE CODE § 816 provides: "When relevant to the determination of
the value of property, a witness may take into account as a basis for his opinion the
price and other terms and circumstances of any sale or contract to sell and purchase
comparable property if the sale or contract was freely made in good faith within a
reasonable time before or after the date of valuation. In order to be considered com-
parable, the sale or contract must have been made sufficiently near in time to the date
of valuation, and the property sold must be located sufficiently near the property being
valued, and must be sufficiently alike in respect to character, size, sftuation, usability,
and improvements, to make it dear that the property sold and the property being valued
are comparable in value and that the price realized for the property sold may fairly be
considered as shedding light on the value of the property being valued."
16 E.g., People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Kawamoto, 230 Cal. App. 2d
18, 40 Cal. Rptr. 685 (1964).
17 CAL. EVwENcE CODE § 822(b).
18 48 Cal. 2d 672, 312 P.2d 680 (1957).
19 Cf., People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Auburn Ski Club, 241 A.C.A.
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tion.20 Both section 815 and section 816 provide for the consideration
of sales "within a reasonable time before or after the date of valuation."
A sale which occurs after the date of valuation is particularly relevant
on the issues of severance damage and special benefits. However, sec-
tion 815 provides that where a sale of the subject property occurs after
the filing of the lis pendens2' and includes only the property being
taken, or part of the property being taken, it cannot be taken into ac-
count by the witness as a basis for his opinion. The reason such sales
are excluded is that the purchaser is in effect "buying" a lawsuit and
speculating on the eventual award. The elimination of such sales
should shorten condemnation trials by removing an item of evidence
which is highly collateral and a generator of unnecessary rebuttal evi-
dence. This exception does not apply where the remainder is sold alone
or is sold with the part taken. These sales are admissible even if they
occur after recording of the lis pendens, since they are not sales of
"only the property or property interest being taken or a part thereof."
Since the Faus case there was some uncertainty as to whether evi-
dence of compaiable sales is direct evidence of value upon which the
trier of fact may base a finding or verdict, or whether such evidence is
received merely to explain and substantiate opinion evidence .22 The
practical effect of this uncertainty was that trial judges had made con-
985, 50 Cal. Rptr. 859 (1966); Covina Union High School Dist. v. Jobe, 174 Cal. App.
2d 340, 349-50, 345 P.2d 78, 84 (1959). In the Ski Club case the trial was had prior to
the effective date of the new statute, although decided afterwards without reference to
CAL. EvIDENCE CoDE § 816 or CAL. CODE Civ. PNoc. § 1271.2 (the interim statute).
20 CAL. ConE Civ. PNoc. § 1249 provides that the date of valuation is the date of
issuance of summons except where the case is not tried within one year, in which case it
is the date of trial unless the delay was caused by the property owner.
2 1 CAL. CODE CIv. PNoc. § 1243 was amended by Cal. Stat. 1963, ch. 70, § 1, at 698,
to refer to recording instead of filing of the ]is pendens at the commencement of an
eminent domain action. Similarly, CAL. EviDENCE CODE § 815 should be amended to
refer to recording instead of filing.
22 The facts and data stated by a witness as the reasons for his opinion do not be-
come evidence in the sense that they have independent probative value upon the issue
of market value. Instead, they go only to the weight to be accorded his opinion. This is
existing case law. City of Gilroy v. Filice, 221 Cal. App. 2d 259, 271, 34 Cal. Rptr. 368,
375 (1963); People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Hayward Bldg. Materials Co.,
213 Cal. App. 2d 457, 28 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1963); South San Francisco Unified School
Dist. v. Scopesi, 187 Cal. App. 2d 45, 51, 9 Cal. Rptr. 459, 464 (1960); People ex rel.
Department of Pub. Works v. Rice, 185 Cal. App. 2d 207, 213, 8 Cal. Rptr. 76, 79
(1960); Redevelopment Agency v. Modell, 177 Cal. App. 2d 321, 326-27, 2 Cal. Rptr.
245, 248-49 (1960); People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Nahabedian, 171 Cal.
App. 2d 302, 310, 340 P.2d 1053, 1058 (1959); People ex rel. Department of Pub.
Works v. McCullough, 100 Cal. App. 2d 101, 105-06, 223 P.2d 37, 40 (1950); cf. Los
Angeles County Flood Control Dist. v. McNulty, 59 Cal. 2d 333, 29 Cal. Rptr. 13, 379
P.2d 493 (1963).
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flicting decisions upon the question of whether a jury can find a value
completely outside the range of opinion testimony in reliance upon
some evidence of comparable sales that have been used by an expert
valuation witness. The Law Revision Commission Recommendation on
Evidence in Eminent Domain Proceedings sheds some light on this
subject.
The value of property has long been regarded as a matter to be
established in judicial proceedings by expert opinion. If this rule were
changed to permit the court or jury to make a determination of value
upon the basis of comparable sales or other basic valuation data, the
trial of an eminent domain case might be unduly prolonged as wit-
ness after witness is called to present such testimony. In addition, the
court or jury would be permitted to make a determination of value
without the assistance of experts qualified to analyze and interpret
the facts established by the testimony and to make an award far
above or far below what any expert who testified considers the prop-
erty is worth-even though the court or jury may know little or
nothing of property values and may never have seen the property
being condemned or the comparable property mentioned in the testi-
mony. The Commission believes that the net result would be length-
ened condemnation proceedings and awards which would often not
realize the constitutional objective of just compensation. To avoid
these consequences, the long established rule that value is a matter
to be established by opinion evidence should be reaffirmed and codi-
fied.23
The recommendation of the Law Revision Commission was con-
firmed by section 813(a), which confines direct evidence of value to
opinion testimony, and by the provision in sections 815 and 816 that
permit evidence of price only as a basis for the witness' opinion.
Another aspect of this same problem that has been bothersome to
trial judges concerns Evidence Code section 813(a). That section pro-
vides that "the value of property may be shown only by the opinions
of" qualified witnesses and the owner of the property.24 The problem
was whether this section meant that the trier of fact could only make
a finding or render a verdict on the exact figures presented by the
testimony of each qualified witness or whether he could make a
finding or render a verdict within the range of the figures presented
by the testimony. The logical construction of section 813(a) is that
the findings or verdict need not be exactly the same as the appraisal
figures of a qualified witness, but must be within the range of figures
supported by the testimony. The basic reason for this construction is
23 3 CAL. LAw RvmioN ComZ'N, REPoRTs, REcOMMENDA-TONS & STUDMIES A6.
24 CAL. EvmENcE CODE § 813(a). (Emphasis added.)
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that section 813(b) provides for a jury view of the property "for the
limited purpose of enabling the court, jury, or referee to understand
and weigh the testimony given .... ." Giving weight to the view of the
property by the jury and its right to judge credibility, disbelief of the
plaintiff's valuation witnesses would naturally produce a higher value,
while disbelief of defendant's witnesses would produce a lower value
and thus be within the range of the valuation figures testified to by
the witnesses.25
Cost Approach
The cost approach, or more accurately the summation approach,
to arrive at an opinion of market value is detailed in Evidence Code
section 820. This section permits the valuation witness in forming his
opinion of the value of the improved property to consider, when
relevant, a summation of the cost less depreciation of the improve-
ments plus an opinion of the value of the land. If the expert bases his
opinion upon a consideration of a summation study, he is permitted
to state the details of the study on direct examination. This section
represents a change from prior California case law.26
Section 820 specifically limits the use of the summation approach
to situations where "the improvements enhance the value of the prop-
erty or property interest for its highest and best use." Therefore the
summation approach is irrelevant and cannot be used where the "exist-
ing improvements" do not enhance the value of the property for its
highest and best use. Evidence Code section 821 provides that the
witness may consider the nature of the improvements on properties in
the general vicinity and the character of existing uses to determine
the highest and best use of the subject property. Thus, the appraiser's
opinion of the highest and best use of the land has to be consistent
with the use of the existing improvements. Since the summation ap-
proach consists of an opinion of land value plus the cost of the im-
provements, the comparable sales used to arrive at an opinion of land
25 The range of testimony concept is compounded by the fact that in a partial taking
case the appraiser testifies to three figures: the value of the part taken, the severance
damage, if any, and the special benefits, if any. The benefits are offset by the court
against the severance damage but not against the value of the part taken. CAL. CODE
Cxv. Thoc. § 1248. Thus, the high range of testimony is the highest value of the part
taken plus the highest severance damage figure as offset by the lowest special benefits
figure. The low range of testimony is the lowest value of the part taken plus the lowest
severance damage figure as offset by the highest special benefits figure.
26E.g., City of Oakland v. Partridge, 214 Cal. App. 2d 196, 29 Cal. Rptr. 388
(1963).
[Vol is
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value necessarily have to be based on a use consistent with the exist-
ing use of the property.
The statute assumes that the normal and customary appraisal rules
can be used by the witness in determining the depreciation or obso-
lescence the "existing improvements" have suffered.
Section 820 uses both the Words "replacing" and "reproducing"
interchangeably. This use may reflect the fact that these words have
been used interchangeably by the courts without a thoughtful analysis
of their different meanings. 27 These terms have been defined differ-
ently by appraisal authorities, a deviation which could lead to widely
varying figures where the appraiser does not give proper recognition
to obsolescence. 28 In appraisal, practice, reproducing means to dupli-
cate the same actual improvement as originally built. Replacing means
to replace the functional equivalent of the improvement. For very old
buildings the replacement technique is normally used, and for new
buildings the reproduction technique is normally used.
Income Approach
The income approach to an opinion of fair market value is codified
in Evidence Code section 819. That section provides that a qualified
witness may take into account as a basis for his opinion of market
value the capitalized value of the reasonable net rental value at-
tributable to the land and existing improvements. The section goes
on to exclude from the capitalization process the income or profits
attributable to the business conducted on the land.
29
The key phrase in section 819 is the "reasonable net rental value"
The use of the word "reasonable" means that the actual net rental of
the subject property cannot be capitalized, but it may be considered
by the witness in arriving at an opinion of reasonable net rental value
pursuant to section 817. The word "net" is not defined and will pre-
sumably have its customary meaning in appraisal practice.
As pointed out above, section 819 excludes the capitalization of in-
come or profits from a business conducted on the subject property.
This provision is qualified by the last sentence of section 817, which
allows a witness to take into account a so-called "percentage lease" on
27 E.g., People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Hayward Bldg. Materials Co.,
213 Cal. App. 2d 457, 28 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1963).
2 8 Aumiuc INsTrrTE oF EAL ESTATE APpnAsIERs, APpnAisAL oF REAL ESTATE
200-01 (4th ed. 1965).
29 The distinction between income from the property and income from a business
conducted thereon is patterned after existing law. See People v. Dunn, 46 Cal. 2d 639,
297 P.2d 964 (1956).
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the subject property only for the purpose of arriving at his opinion
of the reasonable net rental value. A percentage lease is described in
the section as a lease providing for a rental fixed by a percentage or
other measurable portion of gross sales or gross income from a business
conducted on the leased property.
In addition to leases on the subject property, section 818 allows a
witness to consider the rent reserved and other terms and circum-
stances of a lease of comparable property in determining the reason-
able net rental value. No exception is made for allowing a witness to
consider a percentage lease on comparable property. In fact, section
822(f) precludes a witness from directly capitalizing the income or
rental from property other than that being valued.
The capitalization process, though contained in and limited by four
different code sections, is essentially the capitalization of the reason-
able net rental income that the property should produce. The ap-
praiser cannot capitalize the actual rental income or profits either on
the subject property or comparable property. To summarize, the ap-
praiser, in order to arrive at an opinion of reasonable net rental value,
may consider: (1) The rent from the subject property. (2) The rent
from a percentage lease on the subject property. (3) The rent from
comparable property. He cannot consider: (1) The profits from a
business on the subject property. (2) The income from a hypothetical
improvement on the subject property or comparable property. (3)
The rent from a percentage lease on comparable property. (4) The
profits or income from a business on comparable property.
Matters the Appraiser Can Consider
Evidence Code section 81430 states the general rule concerning
other matters which a qualified witness can consider in arriving at an
opinion of value.3 1 Such matters must meet the following four statu-
tory criteria: (1) The matter was perceived by or personally known
to the witness, or made known to him at or before the hearing,
whether it is admissible or not. (2) The matter is of a type that rea-
sonably may be relied upon. (3) The matter is of a type that a willing
30 CAL. EvIDENCE CODE § 814 is substantially the same as CAL. EVrDENcE CODE
§ 801(b). This redundancy should be eliminated by a repeal or amendment of § 814.
81 The term "matter" is defined in the comment of the Law Revision Commission
with respect to Division 7 of the Evidence Code as "facts, data, and such matters as a




purchaser and a willing seller would take into consideration. (4) The
matter is not one which the witness is precluded by law from using.3
2
The above criteria, although stated in general terms, have specific
application to various aspects of testimony by expert valuation wit-
nesses.
The first and second criteria allow a witness to base his opinion
upon various matters, whether or not he has personal knowledge of
them. Thus, the hearsay rule does not prevent a qualified witness from
stating the matter upon which his opinion is based, except when the
hearsay is unsupported and unreliable. The court has had this in-
herent power to prevent the use of such testimony.33 The application
of this rule can create some difficult problems in a conderanation case.
For instance, comparable sales data is usually obtained by the ap-
praiser from the buyer or seller, or their real estate broker, and is
usually used by the witness as reasonably reliable data. This would
not be so if the witness obtained his sales data from a stranger to the
transaction. More difficult is the situation where the appraiser com-
putes the sales price by use of the Internal Revenue stamps on the
deed. In that case it should not be considered as a reasonable reliance,
because there are many reasons why buyers and sellers place addi-
tional Internal Revenue stamps on deeds.
The third criterion for consideration of other matters is based on
a partial restatement of the definition of market value.3" It should be
noted, however, that section 812 provides that the evidence provisions
are not intended to alter or change the substantive law on "just com-
pensation" or the meaning of "value".
The fourth criterion is an important limitation to prevent a witness
from using inadmissible matter as a basis for his opinion, under the
guise that it is a reason for his opinion or because a willing purchaser
and a willing seller would take it into consideration. This same limita-
tion is contained in Evidence Code sections 801 and 802, and is
consistent with the rule in the condemnation case of People v. La
Macchia."5
32 Law is defined in CAL. EVIDNCE CODE § 160 as including constitutional, statu-
tory and case law.
38 People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Alexander, 212 Cal. App. 2d 84, 27
Cal. Rptr. 720 (1963).
34 People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal. 2d 390, 401, 144 P.2d 799, 805 (1943); Sacramento
So. R.R. v. Heilbron, 156 Cal. 408, 409, 104 Pac. 979, 980 (1909); People ex rel. De-
partment of Pub. Works v. City of Los Angeles, 220 Cal. App. 2d 345, 351, 33 Cal. Rptr.
797, 799 (1963).
35 41 Cal. 2d 738, 264 P.2d 15 (1953).
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The application of this last criterion prevents an expert from rely-
ing on the personal considerations of the owner, 6 or the need of the
condemnor to obtain the property, 7 or injuries caused by the exercise
of the police power,8  even though such injuries may actually influence
market value. Without this fourth criterion, damages might be awarded
indirectly for losses for which a property owner is not legally entitled
to be compensated.
Matters the Appraiser Cannot Consider
Evidence Code section 822 lists six categories of matters upon
which a witness may not base his opinion. The introductory paragraph
to this section specifically states that each category listed is "inad-
missible as evidence and is not a proper basis for an opinion as to the
value of the property. ... ." This means that the excluded items are
inadmissible for any purpose. Therefore, improper matters cannot
come in on direct examination under the guise of showing the scope
of the witness's investigation or to test the depth of his knowledge on
cross-examination. Neither can such evidence be used to show highest
and best use, possibility of zoning changes, or any other issue in an
eminent domain proceeding or an inverse condemnation action.
Evidence Code section 803 states the procedure to be followed
where an opinion is based on improper matter. This section requires
the court, upon objection, to exclude an opinion that is based in whole
or in substantial part on that which is not a proper basis for an opin-
ion. Where the witness is required by the court to state the matter
upon which his opinion is based 9 before stating his opinion of value,
and it is apparent from the direct examination that the matter is im-
proper, an objection to the opinion is the means to exclude the testi-
mony. However, if on cross-examination it appears that the opinion
is based on improper matter, then a motion to strike the opinion of
value is the means to exclude the testimony.
36 Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage Dist. ex rel. State Reclamation Bd. v. Reed,
215 Cal. App. 2d 60, 63, 29 Cal. Rptr. 847, 850 (1963); People v. Vinson, 99 Cal. App.
2d 100, 102-03, 221 P.2d 161, 162 (1950).
87 Long Beach City High School Dist. v. Stewart, 30 Cal. 2d 763, 771-72, 185 P.2d
585, 589-90 (1947); Temescal Water Co. v. Marvin, 121 Cal. App. 512, 519, 9 P.2d 335,
338 (1932).
38 People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Ayon, 54 Cal. 2d 217, 224-26, 5 Cal.
Rptr. 151, 154-56, 352 P.2d 519, 522-25, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 827 (1960); People v.
Sayig, 101 Cal. App. 2d 890, 902-05, 226 P.2d 702, 710-12 (1951); Holman v. State, 97
Cal. App. 2d 237, 243-44, 217 P.2d 448, 451-52 (1950).
89 See CA.L. EvmENc: CoDE § 802.
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In order for an attorney to determine if the witness has improperly
considered an inadmissible matter, the only question that the attorney
can ask is whether the witness based his opinion on one of the follow-
ing: assessed value, an offer, an option, or a condemnor purchase. The
question cannot be framed by the cross-examiner so as to include the
amount of the assessed value, the amount of the offer or option, or the
price paid by the condemnor. The practice of "Jamming in" inadmis-
sible facts by a question on cross-examination is thus improper and
could lead to mistrials, or at least to opening the door to a tremendous
amount of collateral inquiry, which would merely confuse the jury.
The case of Rose v. State40 set forth the procedure for the types of
questions that the cross-examiner must ask in order to move to strike
out an opinion based on improper considerations. The cross-examiner
was required to ask the appraiser whether he can segregate out in a
dollar amount the inadmissible matter. If the witness cannot, then the
motion is to strike the total dollar opinion of value. If the witness can
segregate it out, the motion is to strike the dollar opinion of the in-
admissible matter, leaving in the net figure which excludes that item.
The new procedure set forth in section 803 may have changed this
practice. This section provides that the court shall, upon objection, ex-
clude an opinion that is based in whole or in significant part4' on an
improper matter. If there remains a proper basis for his opinion, then
the witness may state his revised opinion, excluding the improper con-
sideration.
Condemnors' Acquisitions
Subsection (a) of section 822 changed the law by excluding from
any consideration the "price," "terms," or "circumstances" of sales of
property to persons or entities that could have acquired the property
by condemnation proceedings. Under prior law, such purchases could
be used as comparable sales, provided it could first be shown that the
transactions were voluntary.4 The Law Revision Commission suc-
cinctly stated the reason such sales should be excluded, as follows:
(a) Sales to persons that could have acquired the property by con-
demnation for the use for which it was acquired should be excluded
from consideration on the issue of value. Such a sale does not involve
40 19 Cal. 2d 713, 733-34, 123 P.2d 505, 518-23 (1942).
41 The determination of what is a significant part is a matter for the discretion of
the court. CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 803, comment.
42 County of Los Angeles v. Faus, 48 Cal. 2d 672, 679, 312 P.2d 680, 682-83
(1957); People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. City of Los Angeles, 220 Cal. App.
2d 345, 33 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1963).
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a willing buyer and a willing seller. The costs, risks and delays of
litigation are factors that often affect the ultimate price. Moreover,
sales to condemnors often involve partial takings. In such cases valid
comparisons are made more difficult because of the difficulty in al-
locating the compensation between the value of the part taken and
the severance damage or benefit to the remainder. These sales, there-
fore, are not sales in the "open market" and should not be considered
in a determination of market value.43
Options, Offers and Listings
Subsection (b) of section 822 clarified existing law which was
somewhat ambiguous. In Los Angeles City High School District v.
Kita,44 the court stated that offers were an unsatisfactory source of
evidence because they were easily fabricated; and in Pao Ch'en Lee
v. Gregoriou,45 which was not a condemnation case, evidence of an
offer for the subject property was allowed.46
This section now provides that the amount offered to buy, sell,
list or option any property is inadmissible as evidence, and is not a
proper basis for an opinion of value, with one exception. An offer,
listing, or option price may be shown where it constitutes "an ad-
mission of another party to the proceeding." The reference to "an-
other party" would seem to include condemnor's offers to settle an
eminent domain proceeding, such as occurred in People ex rel. De-
partment of Pub. Works v. Forster.4 7 However, Evidence Code section
1152 changes the rule of the Forster case and excludes such offered
prices as well as any negotiation statements.48 Subsection (b) also
limits the use of the admission to impeachment purposes, since it can-
not "be used as direct evidence upon any matter that may be shown
only by opinion evidence," i.e. value of the property.
The original Law Revision Commission recommendation stated the
reasons for this rule: (1) Oral offers, often casually made, are gen-
erally unreliable since they are not binding in law, (2) written offers
require collateral inquiry to determine if they were an accurate indi-
cation of market value or if they were influenced by personal reasons
unrelated to market value, and (3) the offeror may not be before the
court and subject to cross-examination.4 9
43 3 CAL. LAw REVISION ComW'i, REPORTS, RECOmmENDATIONS & STUDIES A7.
44169 Cal. App. 2d 655, 663, 338 P.2d 60, 65 (1959).
45 50 Cal. 2d 502, 326 P.2d 135 (1958).
46 Id. at 505, 326 P.2d at 137.
47 58 Cal. 2d 257, 23 Cal. Rptr. 582, 373 P.2d 630 (1962).
48 See CAL. EmVOENc CODE § 1152, comment
49 3 CAL. LAw REmiSoN CoMw'N, REPORTs, REcOmNMENDAIONS & Swors A7-A8.
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Assessed Value
Under prior law, assessed value could not be used as evidence of
the market value. 0 However, a witness could be cross-examined on
assessed value to test his knowledge of and familiarity with the prop-
erty.5' But under subsection (c) of Evidence Code section 822, as-
sessed value cannot be mentioned in questions and answers on direct
or cross-examination.
Subsection (c) does not prohibit the witness from considering the
"actual or estimated taxes for the purpose of determining the reason-
able net rental value attributable to the property or property interest
being valued."5 2 There should be no conflict between this provision
and Revenue and Taxation Code section 4986(2) (b), which relates
only to the mention of unpaid taxes.53
The reason that assessed value is excluded is because it is merely
another person's-the assessor's-opinion of its value. In some in-
stances assessed value is not current and does not reflect market
changes.
Opinion of Value of Other Property
Subsection (d) of section 822 codifies in part the existing case law
which prevents a valuation witness from giving an opinion on prop-
erty other than that being valued or condemned.5 4 This subsection,
by its explicit wording, will prevent a witness from giving his opinion
as to the breakdown between land and improvements of other prop-
erty used as comparable sales. Evidence Code section 816 refers only
to the "price and other terms and circumstances" of a sale of com-
parable property, and makes no mention of the separate value of land
and improvements of comparable property, unless such separate
values are stated as part of the "terms" of the transaction.
In support of this conclusion is the fact that Code of Civil Proce-
dure section 1845.5 was repealed by chapter 1151, statutes of 1965.
This section formerly allowed a witness to "consider and give evidence
50 City of Los Angeles v. Deacon, 119 Cal. App. 491, 7 P.2d 378 (1932).
51 Central Pac. Ry. v. Feldman, 152 Cal. 303, 92 Pac. 849 (1907).
52 CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 819.
53 CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE § 4986(2)(b) provides in part: "The subject of the
amount of the taxes which may be due on the property shall not be considered relevant
on any issue in the condemnation action, and the mention of said subject, either on the
voir dire examination of jurors, or during the examination of witnesses, or as a part of
the court's instructions to the jury, or in argument of counsel, or otherwise, shall consti-
tute grounds for a mistrial in any such action."
54 Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage Dist. v. Jarvis, 51 Cal. 2d 799, 336 P.2d
530 (1959).
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as to the... value of the improvements... of properties in the gen-
eral vicinity."
Noncompensable Items
Subdivision (e) of section 822 requires that the witness exclude
from consideration, in forming his opinion as to value, the influence
of "any noncompensable items of value, damage or injury." Evidence
of value, damage or injury based on noncompensable elements is not
a proper basis for an opinion under existing law.55 A similar statement
is contained in Evidence Code section 814 and is reinforced by section
811, which provides that the article on eminent domain evidence does
not alter or change the law interpreting just compensation value,
damages, or benefits.
Capitalization of Income from Other Property
Subsection (f) of section 822 prevents the use of capitalized values
of other properties in arriving at the value of the subject property. A
witness is limited to utilizing actual comparable sales as permitted by
Evidence Code section 816. A witness can, however, consider the
actual rental income of other comparable properties for the purpose of
arriving at a capitalization rate (i.e. by comparing that income with
the property's sales price) to be applied under Evidence Code section
819. To be consistent with Evidence Code section 819, a witness
would have to compare the reasonable net rental value, as opposed
to raw income or profits, with the sales price to arrive at his capital-
ization rate.
The rationale for excluding comparable capitalized values is based
upon a balance of time consumption versus probative value. Opening
this area of inquiry would require an examination or discovery of the
business practices and accounting methods of each "comparable" busi-
ness. This same objection is present in using comparable rental income
to arrive directly at a capitalization rate; however, at least there is a
sales price present, reducing the speculative nature of the evidence.
55 E.g., People ex rel Department of Pub. Works v. Symons, 54 Cal. 2d 855, 861,
9 Cal. Rptr. 363, 366, 357 P.2d 451, 455 (1960); People ex rel. Department of Pub.
Works v. Ayon, 54 Cal. 2d 217, 224, 5 Cal. Rptr. 151, 154-55, 352 P.2d 519, 522-23
(1960); People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Presley, 239 Cal. App. 2d 309,
314-16, 48 Cal. Rptr. 672, 676-77 (1966); Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage Dist.





The enactment of the article in the Evidence Code on "Value,
Damages and Benefits in Eminent Domain and Inverse Condemnation
Cases" has not solved or ended the evidentiary problems for condem-
nation attorneys, appraisers, and trial judges.
As a general proposition, the codification tends to clarify this area
of law. It has reduced to 13 sections what has been judicially deter-
mined in hundreds of decisions, dating back to the 1850s. For the ap-
praiser and general practitioner who embarks into the specialty of
eminent domain practice, it should provide a convenient legal and
appraisal tool, easily available for ready reference. The science of ap-
praising and appraisal practice, such as it is, cannot all be put into
legislation. Only limited areas can be controlled by legislation. This
was the approach taken by the Law Revision Commission and the
legislature. Its worth has already been proven in assisting appraisers,
trial attorneys and judges, under the interim Code of Civil Procedure
provisions in effect until the Evidence Code becomes operative on
January 1, 1967.
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